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International Law, Institutional Moral Reasoning, and Secession‡
David Lefkowitz, University of Richmond
Participants in the contemporary debate over the morality of secession are
typically categorized in terms of the conditions they argue are necessary and/or
sufficient for a group to possess a moral right to secede.1 Remedial-right, or justcause, theorists maintain that groups enjoy a right to unilaterally secede only if they
are the victims of serious injustice. Primary right theorists, in contrast, argue that
even in the absence of injustice the promotion of political self-determination
grounds a right to unilateral secession, with some disagreement as to whether this
right is possessed only by nations or by any group able and willing to perform the
functions that morally justify the state. Moral theorists of secession may also be
categorized by their method, however, and as I will demonstrate in this paper the
methodological dispute is the more fundamental one. Institutionalists such as
Buchanan and Norman maintain that secession and a right thereto are inherently
institutional concepts, and so can only be theorized on the basis of institutional
moral reasoning.2 Pre-institutionalists such as Altman and Wellman, Moore, and
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The conditions I have in mind here include both features possessed by the group and characteristics

of the circumstances they inhabit.
2

Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Allen Buchanan, “Secession,” The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/secession/; Wayne Norman, “The Ethics of
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Weinstock, defend the possibility of a pre-institutional moral right to secession, and
distinguish arguments, and the mode of argument, appropriate to establishing the
existence of such a right and its content from the question of whether a right to
secession ought to be institutionalized in international law (and, if it should, the
extent to which the content of the legal right should mirror the content of the moral
right).3
My first goal in this paper is to defend the institutional view; i.e. the claim
that secession is an inherently institutional concept and that therefore we ought to
use institutional moral reasoning to argue for or against a right to secession. For
reasons that will become clear below, this leaves any specific argument regarding
the morality of secession vulnerable to the critique that we lack the empirical
evidence necessary to sustain its conclusion. My second aim, then, is to consider the
argument for this claim and to explore how we ought to proceed if there is some
truth to it. Finally, I argue that to the extent we are warranted in our judgments
regarding the effects rival international legal norms governing secession will have
on the advancement of peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights, we
should for the time being preserve international law’s existing stance. That is, we

Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics,” in National Self-Determination and Secession, ed.
Margaret Moore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 34-61.
3

Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001); Daniel Weinstock, “Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 9:2 (2001): 182-203.
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ought to maintain the absence of any right to secede outside the colonial context,
rather than reform international law so that it includes either a remedial or a
nationalist or plebiscitary primary right to secession.
I begin in section I with a characterization of the concept of secession that I
argue better captures its common use to describe, explain, or justify conduct than
does a rival analysis offered by Altman and Wellman. In section II I defend the claim
that secession is an inherently institutional concept, and explain why we ought to
employ institutional moral reasoning to theorize a right to engage in it. The
argument I sketch for these conclusions rests on two key claims. First, I maintain
that we should distinguish between the value of political self-determination and the
norm governing secession. Second, I contend that any argument for or against a
candidate norm governing secession ought to be grounded in an accurate
understanding of the nature of norms; that is, their mode of existence and the
manner in which they causally contribute to the production of social order. These
features account in turn for the properties that characterize institutional moral
reasoning, most importantly the centrality of empirical claims to the success or
failure of any normative theory of secession.
In section III I employ the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory to
rebut several objections to the claim that a right to secession ought to be theorized
institutionally. As these arguments demonstrate, secession’s inherently institutional
nature does not rule out the possibility that an ideal or fully just international law
includes a primary right to unilateral secession, national or plebiscitary. Like
Buchanan, however, I argue that the claim that it does can be little more than
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speculation. In section IV I consider Altman and Wellman’s allegation that the same
conclusion holds for any claim regarding the international legal norm that ought to
govern secession at present. In response, I maintain that for the time being we
ought to adopt a precautionary approach to arguing for an international legal right
to secession, and that this favors a remedial-right to secession over either a
nationalist or plebiscitary primary right. In the fifth and final section, however, I
offer several reasons to doubt that international law would better serve to advance
even the minimal goals of peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights
were we to replace the current prohibition on unilateral secession with a remedialright.
I
Secession involves essentially a claim to sovereign equality. Necessarily, to
attempt to secede is to assert both (a) one’s independence from the rule of the agent
that previously enjoyed jurisdiction over one, and (b) one’s enjoyment of the same
rights, liberties, powers, and immunities possessed by the agent whose jurisdiction
one now contests.4 This construal of secession captures federal as well as
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We can distinguish analytically between secession, which involves essentially a claim to equal

standing within a given community, and claims regarding the specific rights, liberties, powers, and
immunities members with that standing in the community ought to enjoy. In some cases, a group
may simultaneously advance both claims; i.e. assert a right to be recognized as a sovereign equal and
challenge one or another aspect of what it means to be a sovereign equal in the community in
question. In other cases, however, a group may advance only one or the other of these two claims;
e.g. demand treatment as a sovereign equal on the community’s current understanding of what such
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international political secession; i.e. attempts to create new states within federal
republics such as India and the United States, as well as attempts to create new
states within the existing international legal order. Moreover, it also characterizes
conduct undertaken by parishes or congregations within organized religions (as has
recently occurred in the Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches in the United States)
and chapters or other administrative sub-units in civic groups (such as the Boy
Scouts of America).5
Per the above analysis, one agent’s challenge to another’s rule over it counts
as secession only if the party mounting the challenge claims the right to exercise
itself the very same panoply of rights, liberties, powers, and immunities enjoyed – or
that it maintains ought to be enjoyed – by the current ruler. As I explain in the next
section, the content of that set of rights, liberties, powers, and immunities depends
on the particular institutional form political order takes at the point in time in which
a particular group engages in secession.6 It follows that in a world in which states

treatment involves. For a group that simultaneously advances both claims, its attempt at secession
succeeds as long as it is recognized as a sovereign equal, entitled to the same panoply of rights,
liberties, etc., enjoyed by other members of the community in question, regardless of whether it also
succeeds in its attempt to modify the shared understanding of those incidents that characterize
sovereign equality.
5

This observation highlights an important methodological point, namely that the degree to which a

proposed characterization captures the actual use of the concept ought to figure centrally in our
judgment regarding its truth.
6

Institutions are “a public system of rules which define offices and positions with their rights and

duties, powers and immunities, and the like” (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition
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play the central role in the institutional realization of political order, international
political secession necessarily involves a claim to that set of rights, liberties, powers,
and immunities states enjoy under international law, or that the secessionists
maintain states ought to enjoy as a matter of international law.7 In other words, in
such a world secession necessarily involves a claim to recognitional legitimacy.8
Altman and Wellman maintain otherwise. The concept of secession, they
assert, “does not include any reference to international law or to any type of
institution,” but only “the withdrawal of a territory from the jurisdictional
boundaries of an existing state.”9 Therefore “there is no conceptual contradiction in
a separatist group asserting, “we have a right to secede, but we make no claim to
recognitional legitimacy.””10 In order to assess this claim we must first get clear on
what it would mean to make no claim to recognitional legitimacy. Recognitional
legitimacy consists in the satisfaction of the conditions necessary and/or sufficient
to qualify as a state under international law, in virtue of which an institutionally

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003): p. 47). See also Buchanan, Justice, p. 2; David Wiens,
“Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 20:1 (2012): pp. 46-7;
and the discussion in fn 21.
7

As Buchanan writes, “Secessionists typically assert that they have a right to their own legitimate

state, and a legitimate state is an institutionally defined entity, an entity defined as having certain
rights, powers, and immunity under international law” (Buchanan, Justice, p. 24).
8

Henceforth I use the term ‘secession’ to refer to ‘international political secession.’

9

Altman and Wellman, Liberal Theory, p. 57.

10

Ibid.
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organized group enjoys the legal incidents that states possess.11 A group that claims
recognitional legitimacy simply asserts that it meets those conditions (or, perhaps,
that it could do so were other actors to refrain from internationally illegal conduct,
such as unjust occupation of the group’s territory). That is, to claim recognitional
legitimacy is to maintain that one is a state possessed of all those rights, liberties,
powers, and immunities that accrue to states under international law.12 For
secessionists to refrain from claiming recognitional legitimacy, then, would require
either that they govern both people and territory but assert no entitlement to do so
– no right to territorial integrity, to border control, to exclusive jurisdiction over
their subjects vis-à-vis a wide range of conduct, etc. – or that they assert a right to
rule but reject the entire institutionalized political order constituted by
international law. The former seems wildly implausible, and may well be at odds
with the concept of ruling or governing. The latter is certainly possible; indeed, the
Islamic State (IS) – or, more accurately and less ironically, the purportedly reborn
Caliphate – provides a current example. But IS neither characterizes itself as, nor is

11

See Matthew Craven,“Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition” in International Law. (3rd

ed.), Malcolm D. Evans, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): pp. 203-251; James R. Crawford,
The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007):
375-415; Glen Anderson, “Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are We Talking
About?” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 35 (2013): 343-388.
12

Note that the concept of recognitional legitimacy says nothing about what standards must be

satisfied for a group to count as a state, either as a descriptive matter or as a normative one. It takes
no stand, that is, on whether the declarative or constitutive conception of recognitional legitimacy
accurately describes the existing legal practice, or which one ought to do so.
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it typically characterized by others as, a secessionist group precisely because it does
not seek the status of an independent state under international law but instead the
overthrow of a global political order organized on the basis of equal sovereign
states.13 Altman and Wellman’s conceptual claim seems dubious, then, a conclusion
that goes unchallenged by the arguments they marshal to support it.
Imagine a world in which there are states but no international law, they
write. In such a world it would be impossible to claim recognitional legitimacy, “yet
a separatist group could quite sensibly assert that it had a moral right of
secession.”14 History provides compelling reasons to concede the possibility of a
world composed of distinct political communities in the absence of international
law, understood as a political order premised on the existence of modern states.
However, history does not warrant, and we should not concede, the possibility of
secession in a world populated by agents who lack a conception of political order
characterized in terms of sovereign equality. As a conceptual matter secession
presumes a world composed of political communities that neither claim to rule nor
to be ruled by one another, and who share to a considerable degree a common
understanding of the jurisdiction that comprises the independence or sovereignty

13

See Tanisha Fazal, “Is the Islamic State a Secessionist Movement?” The International Relations and

Security Network, February 20, 2015. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail/?id=188149; last accessed July 17, 2015.
14

Altman and Wellman Liberal Theory, p. 57.
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each enjoys vis-à-vis the other.15 And regardless of whether those political
communities consist of states, kingdoms, or empires, secession necessarily involves
a claim to recognitional legitimacy, i.e. to the status of a sovereign equal,
characterized in terms of the common understanding of independent jurisdiction
that prevails at the time a group seeks to secede. To put the point in terms
commonly employed by international lawyers, secession is conceivable only for
those for whom a horizontal political order is conceivable.16 As noted above, absent
such a shared understanding a group’s normative challenge to those who rule can
take only two forms: a rejection of the possibility of legitimate political authority or
a claim to completely replace the institutional framework in which horizontal
political authority is currently realized with one that that realizes a hierarchical
political authority, as in the case of IS’s attempt to replace the authority
institutionalized in modern international law with one inspired by a certain
understanding of Islamic law. Thus to answer another of Altman and Wellman’s

15

See, for example, the discussion of a “nascent international law” in the Fertile Crescent, northern

India, and classical Greece in Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law,
(Harvard University Press, 2014): 13-31.
16

“International law has never flourished in times of anarchy (think of the “Dark Ages” in Europe

from 500-1100 AD), nor, for that matter, in times of hegemony (consider the Roman Empire from 50
BC-300 AD). The ideal environment for the development of international law has been times of
“multi-polar” international relations, where a number of States have competed and cooperated in a
particular part of the world” (David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks, 2nd Edition (New
York: Foundation Press, 2006): p. 2). The claim here is that a norm governed “multi-polar” world is a
sine qua non for secession.

9

attempts to demonstrate the conceivability of secession in the absence of
international law, we can imagine a group attempting to secede in a one-state world,
but only if we also imagine as part of their attempt and as a condition for its success
the development of a set of conventional norms that delineate the domain of each
putative political community’s exclusive jurisdiction from each other, and that
structures or informs their interactions with one another.
Secessionists do not advocate for political self-determination in the abstract.
Rather, they normally advocate for a particular, concrete specification of political
self-determination, namely the same panoply of institutional rights, liberties,
powers, and immunities enjoyed by those who currently rule them.17 The foregoing
argument demonstrates that doing so is a necessary feature of secession. In the next
section I defend the claim that secession is an inherently institutional concept, and
explain why it follows that we ought to employ institutional moral reasoning to
theorize it.
II
Much of the discussion regarding a right to secession is plagued by a failure
to clearly and consistently distinguish claims regarding the value of political selfdetermination from those regarding the justifiability of a norm governing secession.
As the label suggests, a theory of value is an attempt to characterize what makes
some type of thing (e.g. object, act, experience, state of affairs, etc.) valuable, as well

17

“Normally” because, again, secessionists occasionally advocate simultaneously for a change in the

incidents constitutive of sovereign equality.

10

as the appropriate mode of valuing that thing (e.g. by honoring it, or promoting it, or
maximizing it, and so on). Familiar examples include rival attempts to characterize
the value of choice, or of free speech, or most important for our purposes here, the
value of political self-determination. Yet by itself an account of what makes political
self-determination valuable, and the mode of valuation appropriate to it, does not
tell us what sort of treatment counts as properly valuing an agent’s exercise of
political self-determination. Does it require treatment as a sovereign equal, for
example, or only one or another form of intra-state autonomy? Perhaps the former
in some circumstances, and the latter in others – but what circumstances, and why?
What counts as an appropriate response to the value of an agent’s exercise of
political self-determination in a context in which we are also required to value other
agents’ exercise of political self-determination, and/or things other than political
self-determination? These questions do not concern the inputs that ought to figure
in an agent’s deliberation; that is, they do not ask us to characterize the kind of
considerations to which an agent ought to be responsive. Rather, these questions
assume an answer to that question and ask what an agent ought to conclude on the
basis of these considerations; specifically, what an agent ought to do in various
circumstances if he, she, or it is to properly value the exercise of political selfdetermination. A normative theory aspires to provide an answer to that question.
Norms are the justifications actors deploy in order to hold themselves and
one another accountable, e.g. for their conduct, or for particular outcomes, or for

11

their character.18 They exist by virtue of their use within a particular community,
and conversely a community exists in virtue of certain actors’ – its members’ – use
of a common (system of) norm(s) to regulate or structure their interactions with
one another (as well as, in many cases, non-members and/or the natural
environment). At any given moment, a normative system reflects a community’s
current understanding of the values to which its members, qua members of that
community, ought to be responsive, and determines or constitutes what counts as a
proper response to those values across a diverse range of circumstances. Reference
to the community’s current understanding highlights an important feature of
normative practices, namely that they evolve over time as members of the
community contest one another’s claim that a particular norm best serves to
promote, respect, etc. some value, or dispute the values to which members of the
community ought to be responsive qua members of the community, or debate who
counts as a member of the community, and so on. Indeed, some degree of
contestation seems almost inevitable. Such is the case with the norm governing
international political secession, with members of the international community
constituted by international law, or those who seek to influence them (including
political and legal theorists writing on the topic of secession), offering rival accounts

18

For a more detailed exposition of this and many other claims in this paragraph, see Gerald

Postema, “Custom, Normative Practice, and the Law,” Duke Law Journal 62 (2012): 707-38; David
Lefkowitz, “Sources in Legal Positivist Theories: Law as Necessarily Posited and the Challenge of
Customary Law Formation,” in Samantha Besson and Jean D’Aspremont (eds.), Oxford Handbook on
the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2017).
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of the norm that ought to govern international political secession. The account of
norms I offer here entails that any argument in favor of a particular norm governing
international political secession is necessarily a claim regarding what the
international law governing secession ought to be.19 Put another way, secession is
an inherently institutional concept because it is a normative concept, and normative
concepts exist and have the content they do in virtue of their figuring in the often
institutionalized practice of holding accountable that constitutes a group of actors as
a particular community.20
If norms exist by virtue of their practice within a given community, then to
defend or criticize a norm is necessarily to make a claim about the type of social
world one thinks will obtain if members of that community adopt it; that is, if they
use it to hold one another and themselves accountable. In the case of an existing
norm, this involves a description of the actual world and a claim regarding the
causal contribution the norm makes to its realization, both of which may be
controversial. In the case of a proposed norm it involves a description of a possible
social world, typically one alleged to be feasible under certain conditions that either
currently obtain or could do so at some point in the future, and a claim regarding the

19

As I explain in the next section, however, it need not be a claim that this is what the law ought to

be right now.
20

In fn. 21 I suggest that this point might be better put in terms of the conventional nature of norms,

with institutions characterizing a sub-set of normative practices, and explain why I nevertheless
continue to describe secession as an inherently institutional concept and the form of reasoning
appropriate to theorizing it as institutional moral reasoning.
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causal contribution the proposed norm would make to its realization, both of which,
again, may be controversial. In either case, an argument for or against a particular
norm is hostage to empirical facts; i.e. to the truth of the claim that under certain
conditions the norm will become a fairly stable part of the practice of holding
accountable that constitutes the community in question, and that as a consequence
the social world will take the form the argument’s author alleges will result from
members use of that norm to regulate their interactions with one another. To be
compelling, such an argument will need to be responsive to how norms work: how
they causally contribute to social order, under what conditions they produce
particular results, how they originate or cease to exist, what factors strengthen or
weaken their acceptance (i.e. legitimacy) within a given community, and so on. The
phrase ‘institutional moral reasoning’ refers to this approach to defending or
criticizing norms.21

21

I use the phrase “institutional moral reasoning” here because it is familiar to many participants in

the contemporary debate regarding the norm that ought to regulate secession. Nevertheless, there
are a number of ways in which talk of “institutional moral reasoning” may mislead, two of which I
want to briefly address. First, it wrongly suggests that this form of moral reasoning is limited to
institutionalized normative practices, i.e. practices that exhibit some level of specialization in a
community’s practice of holding accountable, when in fact it also applies to critical moral reflection
on non-institutionalized normative practices. Arguably, the horizontal nature of the international
political community entails that disputes over the norm that ought to govern international political
secession concern a non-institutionalized normative practice. If so, then it might be more accurate to
describe secession as an inherently conventional concept rather than an inherently institutional one,
though the basic claim remains that the concept of secession exists in virtue of its use by members of
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Buchanan uses the term “teleological,” while Jack Knight and James Johnson
employ the label “consequentialist,” to describe the fact that institutional moral
reasoning assesses rival candidates for a norm in terms of the social (and natural)
worlds they produce.22 Both terms invite misunderstanding, however, because in
some contexts they are used as labels for a theory of value; again, an account of what
makes something(s) valuable and the mode of valuation we ought to adopt vis-à-vis
that thing(s). But to claim that we ought to evaluate rival candidate norms in terms
of the worlds they produce or constitute is not yet to make any claim regarding the
values we ought to use to rank the resulting worlds. While some might argue that
we should use a consequentialist theory of value such as classical act-utilitarianism

an actual or allegedly possible community of sovereign equals (and possibly would-be sovereign
equals) to hold themselves and one another to account.
Second, the phrase “institutional moral reasoning” may suggest that we can distinguish between
those rights, liberties, etc., actors enjoy in virtue of their membership in some community constituted
by a particular normative practice, and those rights, liberties, etc., some creatures enjoy in virtue of
one or another non-relational property, such as sentience or autonomy. My position, as stated in the
text, is that such an understanding confuses an account of what is valuable with an account of what
counts as properly valuing it in a variety of circumstances, in some of which agents may also be
required to value other things, possibly using other modes of valuation. This stance does not rule out
the possibility that there may still be good reason to speak of non- or pre-institutional rights as part
of a theory of value, despite the risk of confusing them with institutional rights, i.e. normative claims
to specific forms of treatment, experiences, objects, etc.
22

Buchanan, Justice, 75; Jack Knight and James Johnson, The Priority of Democracy: The Political

Consequences of Pragmatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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to do so, others may advocate for a theory of value that includes individual moral
rights. My point here is simply that to argue for or against a norm one must do more
than describe what would make the world good, better, or best (or just, or more just,
or fully just); one must also elaborate and defend an account of how the norm will
function to produce the world one maintains it will. Thus a compelling defense of a
norm governing secession requires a detailed account of how international law
works, or how it could be made to work under certain specified conditions
(consistent with the envisioned community still being a horizontal political order).23
Any norm governing secession will be enmeshed in the larger system of
norms that structure interactions among members of the international political
community (at a given point in time). This reflects the fact that international law

23

For an excellent summary of the various respects in which international law may work, i.e.

causally contribute to the production of an international political order, see Robert Howse and Ruti
Teitel, “Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters,” Global Policy 1:2
(2010): 127-36. Elsewhere I argue that international law’s causal contribution qua genuine law
requires that in most cases most of those over whom it claims jurisdiction treat it as legitimate,
meaning that they are disposed to treat it as a conclusive reason to act as the law directs them to act
(though not necessarily as the only conclusive reason they have to perform that act). I also point out,
however, that even if or where international law is not genuine law, or in terms some might prefer,
where it is law but not legitimate, it may still be prudentially and morally valuable. See David
Lefkowitz, “The Legitimacy of International Law,” in David Held and Pietro Maffettone (eds.) Global
Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016): 98-116; and David Lefkowitz, “A New Philosophy
for International Legal Skepticism? Dworkin, Republicanism, and the Rule of International Law,”
unpublished manuscript.
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structures the interactions of a large number of agents who are responsive to a
variety of values – or at least to a variety of different, sometimes conflicting, ways of
responding to the same value – and whose conduct affects one another, intentionally
or as a side-effect, in a wide range of different circumstances. As a result, the moral
assessment of a particular legal norm governing secession, existing or proposed,
ought to be holistic. This requires attention to the contribution that norm makes or
would make to the efficacy of other norms within the system, whether in terms of
their legitimacy or the prudential costs or benefits attached to compliance or noncompliance. We should also take into account, as best we can, the effects on the
practice of holding accountable constitutive of other legal orders (e.g. domestic law),
as well as non-legal normative orders that contribute directly or indirectly to the
realization of justice (or injustice). Finally, in carrying out a holistic assessment of
an institutional norm like the international law governing secession we must also
pay close attention to institutional capacity; e.g. the design of those mechanisms or
institutions charged with adjudicating disputes over the applicability of a norm to a
specific case, or with its enforcement against violators.
In any community constituted by a normative practice that regulates the
interactions of a plurality of human actors responsive to diverse values across a
wide variety of circumstances, considerations of certainty and predictability,
worries regarding the abuse of nuanced rules, and limits on actors’ cognitive ability
to keep track of the content of complex rules argue in favor of norms characterized
by generality. This implies that we should be extremely wary of inferring from an
argument that a given norm is over- or under-inclusive in a particular case that it

17

ought to be reformed. Rather, those who argue for reform to an existing norm such
as the current international legal prohibition on unilateral secession must make a
case that their proposed change will produce a moral advance when taking into
account all of those circumstances and actors covered by the existing norm.
Likewise, analogical arguments for or against a norm governing secession may have
little probative value. For example, we ought to be careful about drawing any
conclusions regarding the justifiability of a proposed international legal norm
governing unilateral secession from the (presumed) justifiability of a law permitting
unilateral divorce in a particular domestic legal order. If the justifiability of the
latter norm depends on the presence of other norms (legal and non-legal),
institutions, institutional capacities, and material facts that are radically different in
the sphere of international relations, it will offer little guidance as to what the
international legal rule governing secession ought to be.24
More could, and likely should, be said in defense of the claim that we ought to
employ institutional moral reasoning to theorize a right to secession, especially the
metaphysics of norms I suggest it presumes. Here, however, I simply want to point
out how we might reconcile the view sketched in this section with some of the
positions defended by prominent primary right theorists. David Miller, for example,

24

The framework outlined in the text can be used to morally evaluate international legal norms

governing conduct other than secession, of course. See, for example, its use by Henry Shue to argue
against most revisionist just war theorists that the morality of war just is the morally best law of war
(“Do We Need a Morality of War?” in David Rodin and Henry Shue (eds.) Just and Unjust Warriors:
The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008): 87-111).
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differentiates a political theory of secession from a legal one in a way that to a
considerable extent tracks the distinction between a theory of value and a theory of
norms outlined above.25 Consider, too, that while we ought not to rely on intuitions
drawn from reflection on seemingly infeasible and/or underspecified cases to justify
a norm, these intuitions may well play a central role in the development of an
account of what we should value and why we should do so. Perhaps, then, we might
be persuaded by the hypothetical forcible annexation example Altman and Wellman
use to argue for a pre-institutional right to secession to acknowledge instead the
existence of a moral right to political self-determination; i.e. a claim regarding the
value of political self-determination and the mode of valuation appropriate to it.
Insofar as one of the fundamental tasks (indeed, the fundamental task) international
law performs is to allocate jurisdiction, it follows that the enjoyment or exercise of
the right to political self-determination should figure among the ends that a morally
defensible international legal order ought to advance. But what the scope or
content that right might be, and under what conditions and subject to what

25

David Miller, “Secession and the Principle of Nationality,” in M. Moore (ed.) National Self-

Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1998): 64. One way to interpret
Miller’s argument in this piece is as follows: the principle of nationality offers an account of the value
of political self-determination, one to which any political order ought to be responsive, though what
norm or norms constitute the best response to that value, i.e. what rights it grounds, depend on a host
of other factors, some empirical and some normative (e.g. regarding the relative importance we
ought to assign to political self-determination and the secure enjoyment of various basic human
rights).
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procedures a group might rightfully exercise it, are questions we should employ
institutional moral reasoning to answer.
III
While the fact that secession is an inherently institutional concept has certain
implications for how we ought to theorize it, by itself it entails no specific conclusion
regarding the existence or content of a right to secession. Rather, as I argued in the
previous section, the conclusion we should draw on the basis of institutional moral
reasoning depends on the assumptions we make about how the world works, or
could work. Thus those who advocate for a nationalist or plebiscitary primary right
to secession can argue that as a matter of ideal or full compliance theory
international law includes the right they defend, while also maintaining that as a
matter of non-ideal or partial compliance theory international law includes only a
remedial-right to secession, or perhaps no right to secession at all.26 The
assumption of partial compliance is clearly implicit in the argument that creating an
international primary right to secession will lead to an increase in war and
violations of basic human rights. If we assume instead that fear, greed, hatred,
jealousy, a lust for power and status, bias and so on will not lead to resistance to
national or plebiscitary groups’ attempts to secede, and that groups meeting certain
conditions have a moral right to political self-determination, it is less obvious why
we might object to an international legal order containing a right to engage in such
conduct.
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See, e.g., Moore, Ethics, pp. 205-6.
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The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory enables those who argue
that secession must be theorized institutionally to rebut a number of criticisms
leveled against their position. For example, Daniel Weinstock maintains that unless
we postulate a pre-institutional moral right to secession we will be unable to
acknowledge “what seems intuitively plain, namely, that when the circumstances
are just too hostile to grant the right… then there will be some moral loss inflicted
upon the persons whose rights have been overridden, some good which ought to
have been conferred upon her, and thus there will be some balancing of the moral
ledger that will still have to be done.”27 Likewise Altman and Wellman suggest that
only a pre-institutional moral right to secession can account for the judgment that
even if “the right of secession is justifiably sacrificed to peace and human rights…
something of real value has been given up, namely, a certain measure of respect for
the deontological principle of political self-determination.”28 These theorists are
mistaken, however. A pre-institutional right to secession is not necessary to
warrant the judgment that the legal norm governing secession we ought to adopt in
the present circumstances nevertheless involves a “moral loss.” Rather, we can
defend it on the basis of an argument that employs institutional moral reasoning to
demonstrate that as a matter of ideal theory (or, perhaps, an idealized but still nonideal theory) international law would include, say, a primary right to plebiscitary
secession. We could be warranted, that is, in maintaining that at present only the
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attempt to reform to international law so that it includes a remedial-right to
secession is justifiable, while also holding that even if successful such an effort at
reform would not produce a fully just international law governing secession.
Indeed, the defender of institutional moral reasoning simply maintains that we can
only defend this conclusion on the basis of such an argument. For such a theorist,
the claim that a particular legal norm governing secession is justifiable but not fully
just stands in need of an empirically informed argument regarding the motives,
institutional structures, and institutional capacities that constitute a global
normative order containing a primary right to secession.
Arguably, we ought to have very little confidence in any judgment we make
regarding the global political-legal institutional structure that will best advance
justice as a matter of ideal theory. This uncertainty may characterize both ends and
means; that is, what justice requires, and whether a world composed of sovereign
states organized according to international law will best realize it. Moreover, even if
the morally optimal global political-legal order includes states, the legal incidents
they enjoy may differ quite significantly from those states possess under existing
international law. Not only might these incidents be distributed upward and
downward – e.g. to global or sub-state regional governmental institutions – some
forms of authority that are currently exercised on a territorial basis might come to
be exercised on, e.g., a functional basis, or on the basis of membership in groups
whose identities are not linked to specific territories.29 Insofar as we have no idea
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how political authority will be allocated in such a world, we cannot know what the
consequences of an international legal primary right to secession would be, and so
whether it would fare better or worse than other norms governing secession at
advancing peace, basic human rights, and political self-determination (not to
mention whatever other ends we might one day be confident constitute morally
appropriate goals for international law). Thus any moral argument for a primary
right to unilateral secession is bound to be mere conjecture, and should be put in a
highly conditional form.30

Michigan Law Review, 97:4 (1999): pp. 843-930.
30

Whatever international legal norm might govern secession in an ideal world, might a case be made

that if certain politically feasible changes were made to the existing global order, the creation of a
primary right to secession in international law would produce no more wars or setbacks to basic
human rights than would a less permissive legal right to secession (or a categorical prohibition)?
David Copp’s and Altman and Wellman’s brief arguments that an international court exercise
oversight vis-à-vis the exercise of a plebiscitary right to secession might be interpreted along these
lines (Altman and Wellman, Liberal Theory; David Copp, “International Law and Morality in the
Theory of Secession,” Journal of Ethics, 2 (1998): pp. 219-45). One might object that such an
arrangement is not politically feasible in the foreseeable future, and so no less speculative than is a
claim regarding the norm that would govern secession in an ideal (full-compliance) world.
Alternatively, or in addition, one might argue that Copp and Altman and Wellman assume the
existence of institutions and/or institutional capacities the development of which would count as the
supersession of international law, not its reform. That is, their argument requires the replacement of
the horizontal normative order, or anarchical society, that is definitive of international law and a
necessary condition for international relations with the vertical normative order that characterizes
(even a federal) state.
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A second objection to the argument that a right to secession can only be
theorized institutionally is that while such an approach may be essential to creating
just institutions, it cannot offer us any guidance regarding the permissibility of
undertaking secession, or acting to support or suppress it, in the absence of such
institutions.31 This criticism also fails. To maintain that a particular group enjoys a
moral right to secede is simply to hold that international law ought to accord that
group a right to secede. As I noted above, this claim might be formulated in either
ideal or non-ideal terms. Consider the latter first: a group has a moral right to
secede if and only if the legal norm that currently ought to govern secession would
accord them such a right. Note that this is consistent with maintaining that, all
things considered, this group should not attempt to exercise its right to secession.
As for a formulation of this claim as a matter of ideal theory, it too will need to be
spelled out in institutional terms, though for the reasons set out above, it will likely
be a very speculative claim. The key point is that the necessity of theorizing
secession institutionally does not entail that the possession of a right to secede
depends on existing institutional norms, but only on an empirically informed moral
argument that the institutional (legal) norm that ought to govern secession would
accord particular actors a right to secede.32
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non-ideal theory of the right to secession we should allow for the possibility of the moral equivalent
to efficient breach; that is, norm violating conduct that is nevertheless justifiable because it produces
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IV
Thus far I have sought to make some headway in the debate over the nature
of secession and how we ought to theorize an international political right to engage
in it. I turn now to a second point of contention between remedial-right theorists
and some of their primary-right interlocutors, one that involves competing claims
vis-à-vis the international legal norm governing secession that will best serve now
or in the near future to advance or honor the goals of peace, the secure enjoyment of
basic rights, and political self-determination. While this dispute points to a serious
challenge to our ability to defend any particular international law governing
secession, I argue it is one that we can overcome by using a precautionary approach
to defend the superiority of a remedial-right over a primary one.
Remedial-right-only theorists, Buchanan foremost among them, maintain
that the morally optimal international legal norm in a non-ideal world like ours
permits secession only as a remedy for (a) forcible annexation by another state, or
(b) as a last resort response to serious and persistent violations of basic human
rights.33 The case for a remedial-right only norm rests centrally on the claim that it

a superior moral outcome to the one that would result from norm compliant conduct, even taking
into account the costs to the rule of law.
33

Buchanan, Justice, 353-9; Buchanan, “Secession,” section 2.2. See also Norman, “Ethics of

Secession,” 41-3; Steven R. Ratner, The Thin Justice of International Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015): 160-1. Sometimes Buchanan includes as a separate ground for secession
major violations of intra-state autonomy agreements, while at other times he describes such
violations as falling under condition (b) above. The former characterization suggests more strongly
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gets the incentives right. For example, Buchanan alleges that such a norm will
encourage state officials to respect the basic human rights of their subjects, since the
failure to do so will create a legal path to the loss of some of the territory over which
they currently rule. A remedial-right only legal norm may also promote greater
intrastate autonomy, if its explicit restriction of a unilateral legal right to secede to
victims of forcible annexation or gross violations of human rights makes states more
willing to devolve political power to regional or local government. Were a remedialright only legal norm to have such an effect, it might well serve to advance the
political self-determination of territorially concentrated groups, and perhaps their
secure enjoyment of basic human rights as well. In contrast, Buchanan contends
that a primary legal right to secession, whether nationalist or plebiscitary, will likely
fare worse at both encouraging peace and respect for basic human rights and
fostering political self-determination. With respect to the former, he notes that
historically attempts to unilaterally secede are nearly always accompanied by
violence, and at least in the case of national or ethnic groups, frequently involve
campaigns of ethnic cleansing that can become genocidal. As for political selfdetermination, Buchanan suggests that the creation of a primary legal right to
unilateral secession would likely discourage states from devolving political power to
regional governments and/or investing in regions’ economic development, or from
facilitating internal migration, immigration, or asylum, all out of fear that doing so

than the latter an attribution of non-instrumental value to political self-determination, though
neither formulation constitutes a definitive stance on that question.
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might eventually lead to secession and so the state’s loss of territory and population
(and all that follows from it). In short, a more permissive legal norm governing
secession would likely do a worse job of advancing those values a morally defensible
international legal order should aim to advance.
Altman and Wellman challenge a number of these arguments.34 First, they
point out that even in the absence of any international legal right many states
already refrain from devolving political power to regional governments and/or
fostering economic development in those regions because they fear it will lead to
secession. It is not obvious, therefore, that the creation of a primary legal right to
secession would lead to an increase in such conduct, and if it would, how large the
increase would be. Second, they note that the devolution of political power to substate regional governments has sometimes served to pacify separatist desires. It is
possible, therefore, that those who aim to preserve the existing state will conclude
that they are more likely to realize this end by promoting intra-state autonomy than
by centralized rule. If so, then state officials may elect to devolve political power to
regional governments even if international law includes a primary right to
secession.35 Finally, Altman and Wellman suggest that the creation of a primary
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Altman and Wellman, Liberal Theory, pp. 58-65.
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Altman and Wellman fail to note empirical work that explores the conditions under which the

devolution of political power to sub-state regional governments reduces or increases demands for
secession, and the use of violence in its pursuit. Bakke and Wibbles, for instance, argue that
devolution increases ethnic rebellion where there is significant economic inequality between regions,
and where territorially concentrated ethnic or national groups are largely excluded from national
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international legal right to secession may strengthen nationalist or would-be
plebiscitary groups’ bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups within the state, which
may enable them to negotiate domestic political and legal arrangements that better
advance their secure enjoyment of basic human rights and/or political selfdetermination. In other words, contrary to Buchanan’s claim, the legal ability to
threaten secession might actually facilitate intra-state autonomy.
The conclusion Altman and Wellman draw on the basis of these arguments is
not that international law ought to be changed so as to include a primary legal right
to plebiscitary secession. Rather, they maintain only that we lack the data to draw
any conclusions regarding the incentive effects of different international legal norms
governing secession.36 The only defensible view is agnosticism: “…judgment should
be suspended on any conclusion about a right to secede under international law
until those potential consequences are far less uncertain than they are at this stage
in the scholarly discussion of secession.”37 The theorist can rest content with such a
conclusion, but not the political actor; his or her agnosticism does not suspend
judgment but leaves intact an international legal order that more or less prohibits
unilateral secession. Assuming, arguendo, that Altman and Wellman’s agnosticism is

government (Bakke and Wibbels, “Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States,” World
Politics 59 (2006): 1-50). If far more states are characterized by the presence of this kind of
economic inequality and political representation than are not, then only rarely will states have good
reason to pursue the devolution of political power as a means to head off secession.
36
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well founded, what course of action should be taken by those political actors who
could influence reform to, or the preservation of, international law’s current stance
vis-à-vis secession?
One possibility is that they should focus their limited resources elsewhere;
for example, on efforts to reform international legal norms where we have data that
warrants significantly greater confidence that this will lead to an increase in
international law’s advancement of its proper moral goals. The same is true for
those who aim to influence the conduct of political actors, including theorists of
international law and justice. Insofar as they wish to advocate for or against
changes in international law now, rather than merely developing greater knowledge
on the basis of which, at some future point in time, they plan to offer practical
guidance, they should steer clear of secession. While this strategy should not be
dismissed out of hand, it also seems unsatisfactory given the prevalence of
secessionist movements, the number of violent conflicts to which they give rise, and
the frequency with which secession is mooted as a solution to internal conflicts
(regardless of whether they originated in a quest for independent statehood).38 A
second possibility, therefore, is to employ a precautionary approach when arguing
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seeking to secede or gain substantial intra-state autonomy, while a 2001 study found that roughly
70% of civil wars since 1945 were ethno-nationalist in nature. See David S. Sirosky, “Explaining
Secession,” in Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to
Secession (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011) for citation to these and others studies that
demonstrate the centrality of secession movements to the incidence of armed conflict.
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for the superiority of a specific international legal norm governing secession over its
rivals.
The question of how to formulate a precautionary principle (or set of
principles) so that it is both precise enough to be action guiding while also
compelling as a principle (or principles) of rational choice is a vexed issue.
However, Stephen Gardner finds a plausible candidate for a core precautionary
principle in Rawls characterization of the conditions under which maximin
reasoning is appropriate.39 These conditions are as follows: the actor faces a choice
under uncertainty, cares little for the potential gains he forgoes relative to the
minimum he aims to secure, and views the failure to secure that minimum as
unacceptable or catastrophic. Arguably these three conditions are met vis-à-vis the
selection of a legal norm governing secession. First, if Altman and Wellman
correctly maintain that we should have no confidence in predictions regarding the
outcomes different legal norms governing secession will produce, then in deciding
whether we should retain the existing norm or instead seek to replace it with a
more permissive one we choose under uncertainty. Second, there appears to be a
fairly widespread consensus (at least among liberal political and legal theorists) that
peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights enjoy a kind of priority over
the non-instrumental value of political self-determination.40 That priority need not
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be lexical, but we must care relatively little about the advancement of political selfdetermination in comparison to our concern for setbacks to peace and the secure
enjoyment of basic human rights. Third and finally, the gross violation of basic
human rights and, typically, war (or widespread violence) constitute a catastrophic
or unacceptable outcome.41 There is some reason, then, to think that in the present
circumstances we ought to adopt a precautionary approach to theorizing secession,

explicitly grant that where realizing peace and human rights is incompatible with a legal right to
secession the latter right must give way (Altman and Wellman, Liberal Theory, p. 56). David Miller’s
nuanced treatment of nations’ claim (but, explicitly, not a right) to secession suggests the protection
of human rights trumps the advancement of national self-determination. Miller notes the difficulty of
“estimating whether minority rights are likely to be better or worse protected if secession goes
ahead,” but unfortunately limits his remarks regarding what to do in the face of such difficulty to
identifying one way we should not proceed (Miller, “Secession,” p. 71). Further support for the claim
that we care far more about peace and human rights than we do about political self-determination
can be seen in the large literature arguing for armed responses to aggression and gross violations of
human rights, but hardly any arguments at all for armed intervention in support of political selfdetermination for groups that have been neither recently forcibly annexed nor subject to gross
violations of their human rights.
41
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the treatment of peace as a proper goal for a morally defensible international law distinct from the
advancement of basic human rights (David Lefkowitz, “Reflections on the Thin Justice of
International Law: Peace, Justice, and Secession (Ethics and International Affairs Online)). Rather,
peace generally but not necessarily contributes more to the secure enjoyment of human rights than
does war. If that argument is correct, we only need hold that the gross violation of basic human
rights counts as a catastrophe.
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and this requires that we exclude from our deliberations any argument for a
candidate norm premised on advancing or honoring the non-instrumental value of
political self-determination. In other words, the precautionary approach entails that
we ought to select among competing candidates for a legal norm governing
secession solely on the basis of which one we believe will best serve to advance
peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights.
The precautionary approach appears to favor a remedial legal right over both
the nationalist and plebiscitary primary rights to secession. The former tracks and
responds to all and only those goals on the basis of which we ought to assess
candidate norms given our current knowledge, whereas the attractiveness of the
latter rights lies in their serving to advance political self-determination even in cases
where doing so is not necessary to secure peace or individuals’ basic human rights.
But this is precisely the consideration that the precautionary approach requires we
exclude from our deliberation. Of course, primary-right theorists might respond
that their favored legal norm will do better at advancing peace and human rights
than will a remedial-right to secession. Note, first, that to argue on these grounds
would constitute a significant shift from past practice, while also implicitly
conceding that at least for purposes of a non-ideal moral theory of international law
their favored moral account of secession is irrelevant. But second, and more
importantly, it is hard to see why an international legal norm that is not specifically
designed to advance the goal of peace and the secure enjoyment of human rights
would do better at achieving that end than would a legal norm that is specifically
designed to do so.
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The quality of the evidence available to us might once again be offered as an
objection to drawing any moral conclusion regarding the stance international law
ought to take vis-à-vis secession. But the question of whether we have sufficient
evidence to warrant some degree of confidence when making an empirical claim is a
matter of judgment. With respect to the effects on peace and human rights that a
more permissive international legal norm governing secession would have in a
world organized more or less as ours currently is, I believe the evidence warrants
some confidence that we would see an increase in systematic violence and a
decrease in the secure enjoyment of basic human rights. More importantly, since
political actors cannot avoid engaging in practices that support one or another legal
norm governing secession, they must act on the evidence they have, even if it
warrants only a little confidence that one norm will prove superior to another.
It is worth emphasizing the seriousness of the challenge posed by the
argument for agnosticism vis-à-vis the effects of different candidates for an
international legal norm governing secession. If secession is an inherently
institutional concept, then moral arguments for or against a right to secession (with
some specific content) can only be moral arguments for the creation of a legal right
to secession (with that content). These arguments must be made on the basis of
institutional moral reasoning, which as I explained earlier assesses a legal norm in
terms of its contribution to advancing the morally proper goals of international law.
It follows that if we lack the data we need to make any judgment regarding the
superiority of one candidate norm over its rivals, we cannot know whether there is
a moral right to secession (and if so, what its content is). Thus the agnosticism
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Altman and Wellman urge entails even greater limits than they recognize on our
ability to assess the morality of secession.
V
In the previous section I argued that in circumstances like those that
presently obtain internationally, a remedial-right to secession will better serve the
goal of advancing peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights than will a
primary right to secession. But is a remedial-right superior in this respect to
international law’s current stance on unilateral secession, namely that outside the
colonial context no group enjoys a legal right to unilateral secession? In what
follows I offer a number of reasons to think it is not.
Consider Buchanan’s characterization of a remedial-right to secession: a
territorially concentrated group may unilaterally secede only if it is the victim of (a)
forcible annexation by another state, or (b) serious and persistent violations of basic
human rights. At least vis-à-vis the examples Buchanan offers to motivate his case
for a remedial-right to secession for victims of forcible annexation, there is no need
to reform international law to accommodate the intuition that these political
communities had a right to statehood.42 Where one state’s forcible annexation of
part or all of another state’s people and territory goes unrecognized as a matter of
international law, the victims retain their pre-existing legal right to independent
statehood. This was true of the Baltic States, for instance, which were illegally
occupied by the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1991. Nor do we need a remedial-
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right to secession to account for new states produced by the dissolution of a state, as
in the case of the successor states to the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Rather, the original
state’s loss of sovereignty over people and territory as part of its dissolution creates
the necessary legal space in which the new successor states can arise.43 A graver
concern with a legal right to unilateral secession for victims of forcible annexation is
that if it applies retroactively, i.e. to forcible annexations carried out prior to the
incorporation of a remedial-right to secession into international law, it will invite or
exacerbate violent conflict. Few if any borders were established in a manner free
from injustice. In theory this cost might be outweighed by the deterrent effect the
remedial-right would have on potential future forcible annexations. Yet as noted
above, contemporary international law already precludes the acquisition of
sovereignty over territory and people through forcible annexation, and therefore
already provides whatever deterrence might be achieved by the creation of a right
to unilateral secession for victims of forcible annexation.
We should also be skeptical of a deterrence argument for a remedial-right to
secession in the case of serious and persistent violations of basic human rights
perpetrated or condoned by the state. Presumably the territorially concentrated
victims of such a campaign of human rights violations will do whatever they can to
stop it, including the use of force, regardless of whether they have a legal right to
secede. Whatever deterrent effect the likelihood of such resistance provides will be
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unaffected by international law granting the victims a legal right to secede. Third
parties, or at least other states, already enjoy a legal permission (indeed, a
responsibility) to aid victims of systematic and persistent violations of their basic
human rights by their own state, arguably including the provision of military
supplies and even armed intervention. That is, international law either already
includes or could be reformed to include norms that serve at least in part to deter
governments or office-holders from violating the rights of their subjects by
threatening action that would make their removal from office (more) likely, without
having to sanction secession. Such norms are more likely to track the interests of
political leaders than will a norm permitting secession, since such leaders may be
less concerned with the diminishment of the state’s territory than with remaining in
power, and so be more deterred by threats to the latter than to the former. Nor
should we forget that international law already permits a number of practices that
can be used to deter states – or better, government officials – from perpetrating
gross violations of (some of) their subjects’ basic human rights, including economic
sanctions and international criminal charges. Taking all of these considerations into
account, it seems highly unlikely that the fact that their conduct would create a legal
right to unilateral secession for their victims would make the difference in state
officials’ decision not to engage in systematic and widespread violations of some of
their territorially concentrated subjects’ basic human rights.
Moreover, even if we concede arguendo that a remedial-right to secession
would make a small contribution to deterring violations of basic human rights, we
must also take into account any incentives for perpetrating such violations this right
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would create. Donald Horowitz, for example, argues that were international law to
include a right to remedial secession some would-be separatists would be motivated
to provoke the state that rules them into violent crackdowns against their group, in
the hope of acquiring a legal right to secede.44 There is some evidence that exactly
this line of thought motivated the Kosovo Liberation Army’s conduct in the late
1990s.45 Kemoklidze argues that the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state
by some members of the international community created a moral hazard
subsequently realized in the separatist conflict in South Ossetia.46 Others might add
attempts at secession in Abkhazia and Crimea. Of course, we must be careful here;
actual examples of such conduct will not show that recognition of a legal right to
secession would increase their incidence, since they occurred in the absence of such
a right. Nevertheless, they do provide evidence that some actors seeking
independence are prepared to instigate great violence against the very people
whose interests they claim to be seeking to advance. Therefore, we should be wary
of legal reforms that might encourage these actors to pursue such a course of action,
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particularly if we have compelling reasons to doubt those reforms will produce
much good.
Perhaps a remedial-right to secession can be defended on the grounds that
its successful exercise will lead to a decrease in the future incidence of states’
grossly violating their subjects’ basic human rights. Where such a campaign has
taken place, it might be thought that the likelihood that the perpetrators and the
victims will be able to co-exist as equal citizens of even a federal state is less than
the likelihood that they will be able to co-exist as citizens of two independent states.
Whether this is true depends on a host of factors, however. For example, the
division of the original state may give rise to irridentist conflicts, or to systematic
persecution of members of one group that remain “trapped” within the territory of
the state in which the other group is a majority. Indeed, a recent study by Sambanis
and Schulhofer-Wohl concludes that partition does not prevent the recurrence of
civil war.47 More importantly, whether a single- or two-state solution is most likely
to reduce the likelihood of conflict in the future depends on a variety of factors that
vary from case to case.48 Better, then, to adopt a legal norm that gives international
actors greater flexibility to determine in each case which course of action will best
serve to advance peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights. I contend
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that by this measure the existing international legal norm governing secession is
superior to one that would create a remedial-right. While the current norm
recognizes no right to unilateral secession it does permit consensual secession, even
in cases where that takes place in conditions that could hardly be described as
voluntary. The secession of South Sudan provides a contemporary example;
Eritrea’s a slightly older one.
Of course, this argument entails that vis-à-vis their prospects for
independent statehood, members of a group that has been subject to gross
violations of their basic human rights by the state that rules them are largely at the
mercy of other states’ willingness to pressure their state into holding a referendum
on secession. This may strike many readers as problematic. Surely the fate of these
victims should not rest on power and interest; rather, they should enjoy an
entitlement, a right, to their own state. While understandable, this reaction is
mistaken for two reasons. First, whether a group ought to enjoy an international
legal right to secession depends on the contribution a norm according groups of that
type such a right will make to the advancement of peace and the secure enjoyment
of human rights. The mere observation that a candidate legal norm will leave
certain actors dependent on politics does not suffice to show that the norm is
unjustifiable. Second, it is a mistake to oppose law and politics, and to think that the
creation of a legal right to remedial secession offers an alternative to power and
interest – to politics – as a means for achieving peace and the secure enjoyment of
basic human rights. Law can serve to channel politics, to shape its exercise, but so
too power and politics shape the form and exercise of law, as would no doubt be
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true were international law to incorporate a remedial-right to secession. What we
must aim for, therefore, is not the replacement of politics with law but the optimal
mix of law and politics. My position is that at present it is the existing international
legal norm governing secession that does so, not a remedial-right.
One last argument for an international legal right to remedial secession
focuses on the effect that such a legal norm would have over time on actors’ legal
consciousness; that is, the way in which international law informs actors’
construction of the social world they inhabit.49 Specifically, the claim is that
international law’s incorporation of a remedial-right to secession would contribute
to the on-going project of reconceiving sovereignty as first and foremost a means to
the protection and/or promotion of human rights. The crucial question here
concerns the marginal contribution the creation of an international legal norm
creating a right to unilateral remedial secession would have on the advancement of
the human rights revolution in international affairs. This is an exceedingly difficult
question to answer, but my suspicion is that the answer is “not much.” Certainly
international law need not adopt a remedial-right to secession in order to convey an
understanding of state sovereignty (or jurisdiction) as instrumentally valuable and
conditional.

49

For general discussion, see Paul Schiff Berman, “Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law,”

Texas Law Review, 84 (2006): pp. 1265-1306; Jutta Brunnee, and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism
and International Law” in J. L. Dunoff and M. A. Pollack (eds.) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
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The foregoing considerations, then, provide a strong case for the conclusion
that, at least at present and for the foreseeable future, international law will likely
better serve to advance peace and the secure enjoyment of basic human rights if it
includes no right to secession, rather than a remedial one. These arguments are
conditional on empirical premises, of course. The complexity of the phenomena in
question and the limits on our ability to control the many variables that are
plausibly thought to contribute to the incidence of demands for secession, as well as
the use of violence to advance or respond to such demands, warrants considerable
modesty when drawing a conclusion based on such claims. As I argued earlier,
however, we must choose some norm to govern secession, and given the
institutional nature of the concept of secession and the demands of institutional
moral reasoning, we must choose on the basis of the best information currently
available to us.
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